The Electoral Act 2026

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Reform & Loopholes

The Electoral Act 2026 marks a significant shift in Nigeria’s electoral framework. Signed into law on 18 February 2026, it repeals the 2022 Act and introduces a new legal structure ahead of the 2027 general elections. At its core, the Act attempts to strengthen transparency, particularly through technology, while also reshaping how electoral disputes will be handled.

One of its most notable reforms is found in section 60(3), which now gives statutory recognition to the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) and makes electronic transmission of polling unit results mandatory. This is a clear departure from the 2022 regime, where electronic transmission existed only as an administrative practice with no binding legal effect. Alongside this, section 47 formally recognises the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS), while section 60(6) introduces criminal liability up to six months’ imprisonment or a fine of ₦500,000 for any presiding officer who deliberately frustrates electronic transmission.

The Act also attempts to strengthen INEC institutionally. Under section 3, a dedicated fund is created for the Commission, with disbursement required at least six months before a general election. In addition, section 84(2) eliminates indirect primaries, leaving only direct and consensus primaries as the permissible modes of candidate selection.

Despite these reforms, the Act leaves behind some serious legal gaps. The most obvious is the “communication failure” exception under section 60(3). While electronic transmission is mandatory, the law allows a fallback to manual results where transmission fails due to “communication failure.” The problem is that the Act does not define what that phrase means. It could range from genuine network issues to human error or even deliberate interference. There is also no requirement for presiding officers to document such failure, and no clear verification process. In practice, this creates a wide discretionary space that could undermine the very purpose of electronic transmission.

Closely related to this is the absence of a time requirement. Section 60(3) mandates transmission but does not say when it must be done. This weakens the idea of real-time accountability. If results can be uploaded hours later, outside the presence of party agents and observers, the transparency the provision was designed to ensure becomes questionable.

Another major shift appears in section 138(1), which narrows the grounds for election petitions to just two: non-compliance with the Act and failure to secure the majority of lawful votes. This is a departure from the 2022 Act, which also allowed challenges based on qualification. The implication is clear issues of qualification are now treated strictly as pre-election matters.

This is where the certificate forgery issue becomes particularly important. Under the 2026 Act, certificate forgery is no longer a ground for challenging an election result at the tribunal stage. Instead, such claims must be pursued before the election as pre-election matters. However, this creates a tension with the Constitution, which still disqualifies any candidate who presents a forged certificate to INEC.

The difficulty is practical. Pre-election litigation is constrained by time. Under section 29(1) of the Act, parties must submit candidates at least 120 days before the election, while constitutional timelines under section 285 of the 1999 Constitution allow up to 300 days for full litigation. The result is an obvious gap by the time a forgery case is resolved, the election may already have been conducted and concluded. In effect, a constitutionally disqualified candidate could still participate fully in the electoral process, with no opportunity to challenge that qualification at the tribunal stage.

Looking ahead to 2027, the legal landscape is likely to be shaped more by interpretation than by the text of the Act itself. While IReV data is now admissible by virtue of section 60(3), its evidential weight especially where manual results are relied upon remains uncertain. The burden of proof will also be a major issue, particularly where “communication failure” is invoked without documentation.

Ultimately, the Electoral Act 2026 is a mix of genuine progress and unresolved tension. The recognition of electronic transmission, the introduction of sanctions under section 60(6), and the financial autonomy granted by section 3 all move the system forward. However, the undefined transmission exception, the absence of clear timelines, and the restructuring of petition grounds under section 138 especially as it relates to certificate forgery leave questions that only the courts and INEC’s regulatory framework will be able to answer.

The real test of the Act will not be in what it says, but in how it is applied when the pressure of actual elections begins.

The content of this article is intended solely for general guidance and does not amount to legal advice. Readers are advised to seek professional legal counsel tailored to their specific circumstances.